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Abstract
Role-based access control and role hierarchies have
been the subject of considerable research in recent years.
In this paper, we consider three useful applications of a
new role-based access control model that contains a novel
approachtopermissionsandpermissioninheritance: oneis
to illustrate that the new modelprovides a simpler andmore
naturalwayto implementBLP modelusingrole-basedtech-
niques; a second application is to make it possible to deﬁne
separationof duty constraints on two roles that have a com-
mon senior role and for a user to be assigned to or activate
the senior role; ﬁnally, we describe how a single hierar-
chy in the new model can support the distinction between
role activation and permission usage. In short, the oriented
permission model provides ways of implementing a number
of useful features that have previously required ad hoc and
inelegant solutions.
1. Introduction
Role-based access control (RBAC) has been the subject
of considerable research in the last decade [5, 8, 12, 18]
and is widely accepted as an alternative to traditional dis-
cretionary and mandatory access controls. Some important
characteristics of RBAC, which have led to its deployment
in commercial computer systems and applications, include
policy neutrality, support for the principle of least privilege
and ease of management.
A new role-based access control model [5] adopts a sim-
ilar approach to RBAC96 [18] with respect to the role hi-
erarchy and the user-role assignment relation, but proposes
a new approach to permissions and permission inheritance
within the role hierarchy. In this model, each permission is
oriented and can be inherited in one of three ways within
the hierarchy: by more senior roles, by less senior roles
and by no other roles. Consequently, this model provides
more ﬂexibility than standard role-based models. Hereafter
we refer to this model as OP-RBAC (Oriented Permission
RBAC).
In this paper, we investigate various applications of OP-
RBAC. Since the introduction of RBAC, several authors
have discussed the relationship between RBAC and the
Bell-LaPadula model (BLP) [13, 14, 15, 16]. Osborn et
al [15] show that information ﬂow policies in a number
of different versions of BLP can be implemented in RBAC
by the addition of a second role hierarchy and some con-
straints on the RBAC relations. However, these approaches
are somewhat artiﬁcial and limited. The model for permis-
sion inheritance in OP-RBAC provides an alternative way
of implementing BLP within the context of RBAC. We be-
lieve that this new approach is simpler, more natural, and
more effective than existing work in this area.
Separation of duty has always been an important con-
sideration in RBAC models. However, the standard RBAC
model is not without its problems in this area. It is im-
possible for a user to be assigned to, or to activate, a com-
mon senior role to two roles which are mutually exclusive
in the role hierarchy. We will show how to use OP-RBAC to
implement separation of duty constraints on two roles that
have a common senior role and for a user to be assigned to
or activate the senior role.
It has been shown that there are situations where it is
useful to distinguish between role activation and permis-
sion usage inheritance [17]. Such a distinction has been
made in both the ERBAC96 model [17] and the GTRBAC
model [10], by introducing distinct role hierarchies. The ﬁ-
nal contribution of this paper is to prove that an instance of
the ERBAC96 model can be transformed into an instance
of the OP-RBAC model, which requires a single role hier-
archy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section, we brieﬂy review RBAC96, and formally present
OP-RBAC and inter-relationshipsamong the differentcom-
ponentsof the model. InSection 3, we considerthree useful
applications of OP-RBAC: one is to show how OP-RBAC
can be used to implement BLP model with the addition ofa few constraints to the basic model. A second application
is to illustrate that separation of duty requirements can be
deﬁned and enforced in a hierarchical RBAC model; the ﬁ-
nal one is to demonstrate how to implement the ERBAC96
model using OP-RBAC. We also discuss related work in
these areas and compare them to our approaches. Section 4
concludes the paper with some suggestions for future work.
2 Background
In this section, we begin by providing an overview of
RBAC96, and then go on to formally deﬁne OP-RBAC.
2.1 RBAC96
We brieﬂy summarize the RBAC96 model, on which
OP-RBAC is based. We assume the existence of the fol-
lowing sets and relations:
• A partially ordered set of roles RH ⊆ R × R.
We will write r 6 r′ to denote that (r,r′) ∈ RH and
r > r′ to denote that (r′,r) ∈ RH. We write ↑r to
denote the set {r′ ∈ R : r 6 r′} and ↓r to denote the
set {r′ ∈ R : r′ 6 r}.
• A user-role assignment relation UA ⊆ U × R.
If (u,r) ∈ UA then we say u is explicitly assigned to
the role r. We denote the set of roles explicitly as-
signed to u by R(u) = {r ∈ R : (u,r) ∈ UA}
and all roles (explicitly and implicitly) assigned to u
by ↓R(u) = {r′ ∈ R : ∃r ∈ R(u),r′ 6 r}.
• A set of sessions S.
A user u activates a session S(u) by selecting a
subset of the roles to which u is assigned; that is
S(u) ⊆ ↓R(u).
• A set of permissions P.
Permissions are modelled as object-action pairs.
• A permission-role assignment relation PA ⊆ P × R.
If (p,r) ∈ PA then we say the permission p
is explicitly assigned to the role r. We de-
note the set of roles to which p is explic-
itly assigned by R(p) = {r ∈ R : (p,r) ∈ PA}
and the set of roles authorized for p by
↑R(p) = {r′ ∈ R : ∃r ∈ R(p),r 6 r′}.
• A request by a user u for permission p is granted if
u has activated one of p’s authorized roles, that is
S(u) ∩ ↑R(p)  = ∅.
2.2 OP-RBAC
OP-RBAC is similar to RBAC96, but introduces a dif-
ferent approach to permission inheritance. As we shall see,
this approach provides considerable more ﬂexibility than
standard role-based models. Formally, the model has the
following characteristic features.
• A set of permissions P.
Each permission is “oriented” with respect to inher-
itance and can be either “up”, “down” or “neutral”.
That is, P is the disjoint union of P +, P − and P 0,
where P + is the set of up permissions, P − is the set of
down permissions and P 0 is the set of neutral permis-
sions.
We denote the set of roles explicitly assigned to p by
R(p) and the set of roles authorized for p by the func-
tion RE : P → 2R, where
RE(p) =

 
 
↑R(p), if p ∈ P +,
↓R(p), if p ∈ P −,
R(p), if p ∈ P 0.
where ↑R(p) = {s ∈ R : ∃r ∈ R(p),r 6 s} and
↓R(p) = {s ∈ R : ∃r ∈ R(p),r > s}. We say that
RE(p) is the (set of) effective roles for p.
• A request by user u to invoke permission p is only
granted if u has activated one of p’s effective roles,
that is S(u) ∩ RE(p)  = ∅.1
3 Applications of OP-RBAC
In this section, we demonstrate how, with the addition
of a few constraints, OP-RBAC can be used to implement
the BLP model. We also show how OP-RBAC can be used
to removesomeofthe problemsassociatedwith the integra-
tion of role hierarchiesand separationof dutyrequirements.
We also investigate how to incorporate role activation and
permission inheritance in a single OP-RBAC hierarchy. Fi-
nally, we give a comparison of our work with related work
in the literature.
3.1 Implementing BLP using OP-RBAC
BLP [3] is probably the most widely known security
model and implements an information ﬂow policy designed
to preserve the conﬁdentiality of information. The key fea-
tures of BLP are the partially ordered set of security labels
1This is obviously a generalization of the condition used in
RBAC96, which treats all permissions as up permissions, and hence
RE(p) = ↑R(p) for all p.L, the security functionsλ and λc, the simple security prop-
erty πss, the *-property π∗ and the discretionary security
property πds. Each subject (user) and object is associated
with a security label which is determined by the security
function λ.
A subject s may read an object o only if πss is satis-
ﬁed: that is, λ(s) > λ(o). The current security function
λc enables a user to downgrade his security level: that is,
λc(s) 6 λ(s) for all subjects s. A subject s may append
(write-only) to an object o only if π∗ is satisﬁed: that is,
λc(s) 6 λ(o). A consequence of πss and π∗, is that a sub-
ject s is authorized to read and write to an object o only if
λ(s) = λc(s) = λ(o). As in the BLP model, we write r
to denote read-only access, a to denote write-only (append)
access, and w to denote read-write access. Finally, πds re-
quiresthat all requests are also authorizedby an appropriate
entry in the protection matrix M.
In OP-RBAC, we interpret the user’s security label in
terms of his explicit user-role assignment(s) in the UA re-
lation, and the user’s current security label in terms of the
roles he has chosen to activate in a session. In other words,
the user’s security label is system-deﬁned and the current
security label is user-deﬁned. This corresponds closely to
λ(s) and λc(s) in BLP. Additionally, due to the uniqueness
of security labels of subjects, we require that each user is
assigned to a unique role, and can only run one session at a
time and activate a single role. Formally, R(u) = {r}, and
S(u) = {r′} for some r′ 6 r.
However, we can not regard the set of roles explicitly
assigned to a permission, R(p), as the security label of a
permission, because permission usage in RBAC model is
incompatiblewith BLP. InRBAC models, permissionusage
is based on an existential criterion; a user u can use permis-
sion p if there exist roles r and r′ such that (u,r) ∈ UA,
(p,r′) ∈ PA and r′ 6 r. In BLP, permission usage is based
on a universal criterion; a user u can use permission p if the
security label of u, R(u), dominates R(p), the set of roles
explicitly assigned to the permission. The incompatibility
can be resolved by assigning each permission p to a unique
role r. That is R(p) = {r} for some r ∈ R (as is assumed
in existing approaches). Moreover, we require that all per-
missions for a particular object be assigned to a unique role
r, therebyregardingroler as thesecuritylabeloftheobject.
In order to implement properties analogous to πss and
π∗, we must set some constraints on permissionsand access
requestcheckingin OP-RBAC. We requirethatif p = (o,r)
then p ∈ P +; if p = (o,a) then p ∈ P −; if p = (o,w)
then p ∈ P 0. Permission (o,r) is granted to user u if
R(u) ∩ RE(p)  = ∅; permission (o,a) is granted to user
u if S(u) ∩ RE(p)  = ∅; permission (o,w) is granted to
user u if R(u) = S(u) ∩ RE(p)  = ∅. For example, given
((o,r),r),((o,a),r),((o,w),r) ∈ PA, any user u who is
assigned to a role r′ ∈ ↑r has read access to object o, and
any user u who has activated a role r′ ∈ ↓r has append ac-
cess. However, only a user u who is assigned to r and has
activated r has write access to the object.
Furthermore, it is at least possible to implement some
coarse-grained discretionary properties using OP-RBAC.
Suppose that we do not wish users with security label r to
have append access to objects with security label r′ > r.
Then we simply insist that (o,a) is a down permission. In-
stead the administrator can deﬁne this permission to be a
neutral permission, so that only users with security label
r′ can append to o. Of course, the administrator can also
assign this neutral permission to other roles r′′ 6 r′ if de-
sired. In other words, making certain permissions neutral
rather than up or down, gives limited support for policies
deﬁned at the administrator’s discretion.
3.2 Separation of duty
Separation of duty is a widely recognized business prin-
ciple that is used to preventconﬂict of interests arising or to
prevent fraudulent actions. At its simplest, it requires that
if a sensitive task is comprised of two steps, then the same
user can not perform both steps. Separation of duty in role-
based systems has attracted considerable research interest
in the literature [1, 4, 6, 11, 19].
If p and q are mutually exclusive permissions, the stan-
dard RBAC approach is to assign p and q to two different
incomparable roles r1 and r2. Static separation of duty
requires that no user can be assigned to both r1 and r2,
whereas dynamic separation of duty requires that no user
can activate both r1 and r2 in the same session. In standard
hierarchicalrole-basedsystems, static separationofdutyre-
quires either that RE(p) ∩ RE(q) = ↑R(p) ∩ ↑R(q) = ∅,
or for all roles r ∈ ↑R(p) ∩ ↑R(q), no user is assigned to
or allowed to activate r. In the simplest case when p and q
are assigned to different incomparable roles r1 and r2, this
means either that r1 and r2 have no common senior role or
that no user can be assigned to or activate any common se-
nior role r. Unfortunately, this condition will usually com-
pletely remove the advantage that role hierarchies provide
in reducing administration of the access control system. In
short, separation of duty and role hierarchies are effectively
mutually exclusive features of standard RBAC.
As in the standard RBAC approach, if p and q are
mutually exclusive permissions and we want to ensure
static separation of duty, we require in OP-RBAC that
RE(p) ∩ RE(q) = ∅ and for all u ∈ U, R(u)∩RE(p) = ∅
or R(u) ∩ RE(q) = ∅. Figure 1 illustrates the four ways of
ensuringthat for mutuallyexclusivepermissions p and q as-
signed to roles r1 and r2 respectively, RE(p)∩RE(q) = ∅.
(The roles enclosed by a curve illustrate the effective set of
roles for each permission.) The most direct way is to make
p and q neutral permissions and assign them to roles r1 andr2 respectively, as shown in Figure 1(a). Therefore, u can
be assigned to the more senior role r without acquiring the
mutually exclusive permissions p and q. In addition, Fig-
ures 1(b)–1(d) shows that it is possible for u to be assigned
to senior roles r or r′ by deﬁning p and q to be other types
of permissions.
Note that the relationship between static separation of
duty and dynamic separation of duty is different in OP-
RBAC compared to standard RBAC. In standard RBAC, a
useruis authorizedfortheset ofpermissions,P(u) = {p ∈
P : ∃r,r′ ∈ R,(u,r) ∈ UA,(p,r′) ∈ PA,r > r′}, and the
set of permissions available to u in a session is monotonic
with respect to the role hierarchy. In other words, if r 6 r′,
it is always the case that the set of permissions available in
a session in which r has been activated is a subset of those
available in a session in which r′ has been activated. Since
the permissions available in a session are always a subset of
those for which a user is authorized, we have that the en-
forcement of static separation of duty implies the enforce-
ment of dynamic separation of duty.
However, in OP-RBAC, the permissions available in a
session are not monotonic with respect to the roles that
have been activated. In other words, although we may have
r 6 r′, it may not be the case that the set of permissions
available in a session in which r has been activated are a
subset of those available in a session in which r′ has been
activated. This is because permissionsare oriented. In other
words, if static separation of duty is enforced in OP-RBAC,
it does not imply that dynamic separation of duty is satis-
ﬁed in OP-RBAC. However, if we want to ensure dynamic
separation of duty in OP-RBAC, we only require that for all
u ∈ U, either S(u)∩RE(p) = ∅ or S(u)∩RE(q) = ∅ and
RE(p) ∩ RE(q) = ∅.
3.3 Usage and activation hierarchies
In most RBAC models, the role hierarchyserves two dis-
tinct purposes. A role is assumed to inherit the permissions
assigned to roles below it in the hierarchy; this is called the
(permission) usage aspect of the role hierarchy. In addition,
a user assigned to a particularrole can also activate anysub-
ordinate roles in the hierarchy; this is called the activation
aspect of the role hierarchy.
Sandhu showed that making this distinction between us-
age and activation hierarchies has a number of useful ap-
plications [17]. In particular, it provides an alternative way
of solving the incompatibility between static separation of
duty constraints and the role hierarchy in RBAC96.
The ERBAC96 model (extended RBAC96) has a sepa-
rate activation hierarchy, which extends the usage hierar-
chy of RBAC96 [17]. Formally, we have a usage hierar-
chy RH u and an activation hierarchy RH a, where RH u ⊆
RH a. In other words, r 6u r′ implies that r 6a r′. A
user’s interaction with the system is modelled by a session,
where a user u activates a set of roles S(u) ⊆ ↓aR(u). The
set of permissions for which u is authorized u in a session
S(u) is denoted by
P(s) =
 
r∈S(u)
{p ∈ P : ∃r′ 6u r,(p,r′) ∈ PA}.
Figure 2 on page 5 shows an exampleof an activationhi-
erarchy and two different usage hierarchies, which will be
used to demonstrate how it is possible to deﬁne a separa-
tion of duty requirement on r2 and r3 and still be able to
activate the common senior role r1. A user u, who is as-
signed to role r1, is allowed to activate any junior roles in
the activation hierarchy shown in Figure 2(a). However, if
u activates role r1, u can not acquire permissions assigned
to roles r2 and r3, because there is no inheritance relation
between roles r1 and r2 in the permission usage hierarchies
shown in Figure 2(b) and 2(c).
We can implement this distinction between role acti-
vation and permission usage in OP-RBAC using only a
single role hierarchy, up permissions and neutral permis-
sions. Up permissions are inherited by more senior roles
and neutral permissions are inherited by no other roles in
the role hierarchy. The type of each permission is deter-
mined by the usage hierarchy, and the new permission as-
signment relation is determined by the usage hierarchy and
the permission type. We can transform an ERBAC96 sys-
tem (UA,PA,RH u,RH a,P) into an OP-RBAC system
(UA,PA
′,RH a,P ′) using the following procedure:
1. LetP + denotetheset ofuppermissionsandP 0 denote
the set of neutral permissions;
2. Let PA
+ denote the permission-role assignments for
uppermissionsandPA
0 denotethepermission-roleas-
signments for neutral permissions;
3. For all r ∈ R such that ↑ar  = ↑ur, and for all
p ∈ P such that (p,r) ∈ PA, we deﬁne p ∈ P 0,
(p,r) ∈ PA
0, and for all r′ ∈ ↑ur, (p,r′) ∈ PA
0;
4. For all r ∈ R such that ↑ar = ↑ur, and for all
p ∈ P such that (p,r) ∈ PA, we deﬁne p ∈ P +,
(p,r) ∈ PA
+;
5. For all p ∈ P such that (p,r) ∈ PA
0 and
(p,r′) ∈ PA
+, we deﬁne p ∈ P 0, and for all
r′′ ∈ ↑ur′, (p,r′′) ∈ PA
0, and remove (p,r′) from
PA
+;
6. Deﬁne P ′ = P + ∪ P 0 and PA
′ = PA
+ ∪ PA
0.
We now show how the transformation works by taking
the example of the ERBAC96 system illustrated in Figure 2
and the permission-role assignment relation in Figure 3(a).t
r
′
@
@
@
@
t r1
￿
￿
￿
￿
tr2 @
@
@
@
￿
￿
￿
￿
t r
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
￿￿
(a) p,q ∈ P 0
t
r
′
@
@
@
@
t r1
￿
￿
￿
￿
tr2 @
@
@
@
￿
￿
￿
￿
t r
￿￿
￿￿
. ... ... .. .. . .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .
. . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .
.. . .. . .. . .. . . .. . ..
. .. .. . .. . .. .. . .. .
. .. .. .. . .. .. .. ..
(b) p ∈ P +,q ∈ P 0
t
r
′
@
@
@
@
t r1
￿
￿
￿
￿
tr2 @
@
@
@
￿
￿
￿
￿
t r
￿￿
￿￿
. .. .. .. .. . .. .. ..
.. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .
. .. . . .. . .. . .. . .. . .
.. . . .. . . . .. . . .. . . ..
. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
.. . . . . . . .. ... .. .. ... .. ... ...
(c) p ∈ P −,q ∈ P 0
t
r
′
@
@
@
@
t r1
￿
￿
￿
￿
tr2 @
@
@
@
￿
￿
￿
￿
t r
... ... ... .. .. .. ... .. . .. . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .
. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . .
. .. . .. . .. . .. . . .. . .
. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . ..
.. .. .. .. .. . .. .. .
... ... ... .. .. ... .. .. . .. . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .
. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . .
.. . . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .
. .. . .. . .. .. . .. . ..
. . .. .. .. .. .. . .. .
(d) p ∈ P +,q ∈ P −
Figure 1. Implementing separation of duty using different types of permissions
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Figure 2. Activation and usage hierarchies
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(c) PA′ in OP-RBAC for Fig. 2(c)
Figure 3. Transforming the ERBAC96 permission set and PA relation
Firstly, we consider the example of usage hierarchy in Fig-
ure 2(b). Let us assume that the ﬁrst role examined by the
transformation procedure is role r4. The ﬁrst stage is to
compute all roles which are senior to r4 in the activation hi-
erarchy,that is {r1,r2,r3,r4} andall roles whichare senior
to r4 in the usage hierarchy, that is {r2,r3,r4} . Hence we
ﬁnd that ↑ar4  = ↑ur4; using Step 3 we deﬁne all permis-
sions (only p4 in our example) assigned to r4 to be neutral
permissions and assign all such permissions to r2 and r3.
We repeat this procedure for roles r2, r3, and r1. Finally,
we outputthe set of neutralpermissions {p2,p3,p4}, the set
of up permissions{p1} and the new permission-roleassign-
ment relation PA
′ shown in Figure 3(b).
For the second usage hierarchy in Figure 2(c), we ﬁrstly
take the role r4, for example, to be examined by the trans-
formation procedure. We ﬁnd that ↑ar4 = ↑ur4 and deﬁne
p4 assigned to r4 to be an up permission (Step 4). Re-
peating the process for the remaining roles, we ﬁnd that
(p2,r2) ∈ PA
0 and (p2,r3) ∈ PA
+ (Step 5). Hence, we
add (p2,r3) and (p2,r1) to PA
0 and delete (p2,r3) from
PA
+ (Step 5). Finally, the new permission role assignment
relation PA
′ is generated as shown in Figure 3(c).
We now prove that the transformed OP-RBAC system is
equivalent to the ERBAC96 system, in the sense that it re-
turns the same answer as the original system for all possible
access requests.
Theorem 1 Let Σ = (UA,PA,RH a,RH u,P) deﬁne an
ERBAC96 system and Σ′ = (UA,PA
′,RH a,P ′) deﬁne aOP-RBAC system derived from the ERBAC96 system in the
manner described above. Then for all p ∈ P, RE(p) in Σ
is equal to RE(p) in Σ′.
Proof For convenience we write R′
E(p) to denote RE(p)
in Σ′.
We ﬁrst prove that RE(p) ⊆ R′
E(p). Let r ∈ RE(p):
then there exists r′ such that (p,r′) ∈ PA and r >u r′.
There are two cases to consider. If ↑ar′  = ↑ur′, then by
Step 3, (p,r) ∈ PA
0 and r ∈ R′
E(p). If ↑ar′ = ↑ur′, then
by Step 4, (p,r′) ∈ PA
+. Since r >u r′, by deﬁnition
of ERBAC96, r >a r′. Hence r ∈ R′
E(p). (Note that
if (p,r′) ∈ PA
0 and (p,r′) ∈ PA
+, then we add (p,r)
to PA
0, using Step 5, and hence r ∈ R′
E(p).) Therefore,
RE(p) ⊆ R′
E(p).
We now prove that R′
E(p) ⊆ RE(p). Let r ∈ R′
E(p):
then there are two cases to consider. If p ∈ P 0 and (p,r) ∈
PA
0, then there exists r′ 6u r and (p,r′) ∈ PA (by Steps 3
and 5). By deﬁnition, r ∈ RE(p). Alternatively, if p ∈ P +,
then there exists r >a r′ and (p,r′) ∈ PA
+. By Step 4,
r >u r′ and (p,r′) ∈ PA. Again, by deﬁnition, r ∈ RE(p).
Therefore R′
E(p) ⊆ RE(p). The result now follows. ￿
Corollary 2 User u is authorized for p in Σ if and only if u
is authorized for p in Σ′.
Proof For any session s that user u can create in Σ, u can
create exactly the same session in Σ′, becausethe activation
hierarchyRHa is usedinΣ′. uis authorizedforp in session
s, if and only if there exists r ∈ s such that r ∈ RE(p). By
Theorem 1, r ∈ RE(p) if and only if r ∈ R′
E(p). ￿
In summary, permission usage requirements in the sys-
tem determine how to assign different types of permissions
to roles in OP-RBAC. In certain situations, neutral permis-
sions must be assigned to several hierarchical roles, which
somewhat adds to the complexityof permission administra-
tion. On the other hand, the approach adoptedin OP-RBAC
offerssimplicitybyusingasinglerolehierarchy. Hence, we
might expect that it would be easier to administer an OP-
RBAC system rather than an ERBAC96 one. This would be
an interesting direction for future work.
3.4 Related Work
There have been several attempts to implement BLP
models using role-based models [13, 14, 15, 16]. Osborn et
al’s approach [13, 14, 15] shows how the role-graph model
can be conﬁgured to enforce information ﬂow policies. In
their approach the lattice of security label is deﬁned sepa-
rately and independently from the role graph. Each subject
and object is assigned a security label as in BLP. Then the
r-level of a role r, denoted by r-level(r), is deﬁned to be the
least upper bound of the security labels of the objects for
which (o,r) is in the permissions of the role r; and the a-
level of a role r, denoted by a-level(r), is the greatest lower
bound of the security labels of the objects for which (o,a)
is in the permissions of the role r. For all (u,r) ∈ UA, the
security level of a user u must be greater than or equal to
the r-level of r, and for all (u,r) ∈ UA, the security level
of a user u must be less than or equal to the a-level of r. We
think their approach for simulating the basic information
ﬂow policy using role-based access control is complicated,
because their approach needs to introduce an extra lattice
structure to determine the security labels of users and ob-
jects, andrequiresmodiﬁcationto therole-graphalgorithms
to compute the r-level and a-level of each role in the role
graph model.
An alternative approach was developed by Sandhu et
al [15, 16]. This involved deﬁning two hierarchies, one for
read roles and one for append roles. The append hierarchy
is the dual of the read hierarchy: that is, x 6 y in the ap-
pend hierarchy if and only if x > y in the read hierarchy.
A number of constraints, similar to a number of ours were
also deﬁned. Each pair of permission (o,r) and (o,a) is
assigned to exactly one matching pair of xr and xa roles in
RH r and RH a respectively. Thereby, the security label of
object o is implicitly deﬁned to be x. Each session has ex-
actly two matching roles yr and ya, and then y is regarded
as the security label of user u. A read permission is granted
if yr > xr in RH r and an append permission is granted
if ya > xa in RH a. Note that RH a is the dual of RH r,
thereby the condition of granting an append permission is
ya 6 xa in original lattice structure. We think it is not
necessary to use a second hierarchy. More importantly, this
approach can not cope with a compound(write) permission
that has both read and append access rights to an object and
does not consider discretionary aspects of the BLP model.
Compared with previous attempts, we believe OP-
RBAC, with the addition of a few constraints, provides a
more direct implementation of BLP model. We do not re-
quire an additional hierarchy and are able to support the as-
signment of read-write permissions. Perhaps the most sig-
niﬁcant contribution of the OP-RBAC model is the support
for some limited discretionary policies, something existing
work does not consider and would be ill-equippedto imple-
ment.
ERBAC96 [17] and GTRBAC [10] deﬁne multiple hi-
erarchies that make it possible to implement separation of
duties between two roles that have a common senior role.
However, OP-RBAC provides much simpler way to solve
the separation of duty requirement by assigning different
types of permissions to these two roles in a single role hi-
erarchy. In addition, it has been illustrated that usage and
activation hierarchies in ERBAC96 can be implemented in
a single role hierarchy in OP-RBAC. In other words, all the
advantages of ERBAC96 can be supported by OP-RBACusing a single hierarchy.
4 Conclusions and future work
We have considered three useful applications of the OP-
RBAC model, which arise because of its alternative treat-
mentof permissioninheritance. We notedthat ourapproach
provides a more natural implementation of BLP model us-
ing role-based techniques in a single role hierarchy. Our
approach provides the ﬁrst such implementation that sup-
ports the assignment of compound permissions (both read
and append access to objects) and demonstrates how it is
possible to incorporate limited support for the discretionary
security property of BLP, something that no existing work
is able to do.
A second application is to make it possible for a user
to be assigned to or activate a role when it is more senior
than two mutually exclusive roles. To our knowledge, no
other RBAC models are able to do this with a single role
hierarchy.
Finally, we have described a way of supportingboth per-
mission usage and activation inheritance within a single hi-
erarchy. We have deﬁned a transformation that generates a
OP-RBAC system that is equivalent to a given ERBAC96
system.
A ﬁrstpriorityinfutureworkistodevelopa generalmul-
tilevel secure model based on OP-RBAC with the consider-
ation of inter-object information ﬂow and complex permis-
sions. We also like to investigate whether XACML is sufﬁ-
cient to deﬁne access control policies for the general model
and hope to start work on the implementation of the model
using Java. Other future work is to introduce OP-TRBAC
(Oriented Permission Temporal RBAC) that takes into ac-
count of temporal aspects of OP-RBAC. Finally, we intend
to extend existing delegation models [2, 7, 20] for RBAC to
OP-RBAC. It has been suggested that “upward delegation”,
which allows a user to delegate a permission to roles more
senior than the role to which the permission is assigned, is a
desirable feature in GTRBAC [9]. The ﬂexible approach to
permission inheritance in OP-RBAC, suggests that it would
be straightforwardto incorporatethis feature in a delegation
model for OP-RBAC.
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